INTRODUCTION
Courts of law are poorly equipped to hear allegations that a multinational corporation ("MNC") has transgressed human rights 1 or committed other global torts.
abuses are currently emerging in Qatar, implicating a number of companies building FIFA's 2022 World Cup stadiums. 10 Reports from Qatar suggest that low-skilled Indian and Nepalese laborers are enticed to work on the stadiums, forced to surrender their passports upon arrival.
11
Once trapped in the country, immigrant workers are subjected to treacherous labor conditions described as an ongoing human rights crisis by employment and construction companies. 12 Over 500 Indians have already died from work-related incidents 13 while another 4,000 are expected to perish before the World Cup begins.
14 But notably there is little chance that a court in Qatar, or any other country, will hear the victims' claims. 15 While this legal vacuum has, and continues, to draw international outrage, arbitration is quietly emerging as perhaps the most effective means to redress torts and crimes committed by corporate entities. 16 The use of arbitration as a human rights tool is particularly counterintuitive considering the perception company's oil pipeline and dismissing the plaintiffs' Alien Tort Statute claim due to a lack of jurisdiction and state law tort claims upon international comity). 10 ' Conditions, TELEGRAPH, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/10748171/QatarWorld-Cup-Stadium-builders-working-in-sub-human-conditions.html ("[There is] evidence of migrant workers being lured to the Gulf state by the promise of good salaries, only to have their passports taken away so they cannot return home."). 12 (reporting the Indian Embassy's research that at least 500 Indian migrant workers constructing the World Cup stadiums have died, mainly due to poor working conditions).
14 ITUC, THE CASE AGAINST QATAR 14 (2014), available at http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/the_case_against_qatar_en_web170314.pdf. 15 So far, it does not appear that a credible lawsuit has been filed in Qatar or elsewhere seeking redress for deaths and injuries suffered by a migrant worker working on Qatar's stadiums. See generally Crocombe, supra note 12, at 35 (explaining the lack of legal protections and causes of action afforded to migrant workers in Qatar). 16 ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH 2 (May 13, 2013), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf [hereinafter BANGLADESH ACCORD] (noting that a "Steering Committee" is the first arbiter of disputes, and appeals must be submitted to binding arbitration).
actors, mitigating most practical and political dangers implicated by courts of law. 21 In other words, private forums can act in certain areas where courts may not. And now a collection of international organizations-including the United Nations, 22 the International Labor Organization, 23 and the International Olympic Committee 24 -have enacted, or are in the process of discussing, contracts and agreements that promote human rights enforced by arbitration. 25 This Article details the untold story of how an effective model of human rights enforcement was innovated, where the rules of corporate responsibility are established by contract and noncompliance is sanctioned by private remedies.
The contribution of this Article is both theoretical and practical. Considering that MNCs rarely suffer liability abroad, this Article identifies an emerging, understudied type of international agreement able to hold MNCs responsible for torts in the developing world. 26 On a theoretical level, the research herein identifies situations in which arbitral decisions are superior to judicial rulings. This Article also advances the private dispute resolution literature, which has developed slowly territorial sovereignty underpins the right of host countries to regulate impacts and activities in their territory and prevents other states from interfering."). 21 See infra Part IV (discussing how certain qualities of private dispute resolution allow it to resolve matters involving international political difficulties in a manner that public courts of law may not). 22 Infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (discussing a proposal in front of the United Nations to create a regime enforcing human rights with binding arbitration). 23 Infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text (noting that the International Labor Organization is a party to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety which obligates apparel companies to certain labor standards, using international arbitration as an enforcement mechanism). 24 Infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (noting that Olympic host city contracts now include human rights clauses and that all disputes arising under an Olympics contract must be submitted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport). 25 Claes Cronstedt, Remarks at the United Nations Annual Forum on Business and Human Rights (Dec. 3, 2014) (proposing a United Nations regime to enforce corporate human rights standards using international arbitration); Panel discussing an International Arbitral Tribunal on Business and Human Rights, Side Session at the United Nations Business and Human Rights Forum (Dec. 3, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Business and Human Rights Panel]. 26 One article that provides substantial and meaningful insights was written by Professor Roger Alford, which considers how arbitration could be used to overcome the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in actions against national governments and other sovereign actors accused of human rights abuses. Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508 (2008) . [Vol. 89:1079 due to arbitration's private and confidential nature. 27 The works that do discuss arbitration overwhelmingly assume that the process favors corporations, rarely mentioning arbitration's socially desirable qualities. 28 Thus, this Article offers a needed discussion of the advantages arbitration presents over courts of law, as well as the legal implications of litigating and arbitrating against MNCs.
Part I explores the law of suing western companies in the developing world, adding policy insights to the reasons why MNCs are largely immune from suit. Part II reviews the nature and efficacy of private remedies, which is accomplished by framing the arbitration debate from several perspectives. Part III offers a discussion of recent contracts and international agreements that use arbitration as a means to hold MNCs accountable. Then, Part IV discusses potential applications of such a mechanism, followed by the Conclusion.
I. THE FUTILITY OF SUING CORPORATIONS OVER FOREIGN ACTS
The legal framework governing international torts typically prevents courts of law from remedying, or even hearing, corporate human rights violations. 29 It is rarely mentioned, however, that this landscape resulted from global necessity. Indeed, for the sake of greater international security, western nations are impeded from regulating even their own corporations 27 See Stavros L. Brekoulakis, International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 745, 745 (2013) (stating that the scholarly community has produced little substantive work about the process of arbitration, limiting what is known about how arbitral panels resolve disputes). 28 See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 17, at 666-67 (discussing the unjust consequences of binding arbitration clauses). 29 See Tawny in the developing world. 30 The following outlines the legal framework frustrating human rights victims and the historical developments that necessitated it.
A. The Legal Framework of Human Rights and Corporations
The most appropriate place to file a human rights lawsuit is wherever the underlying incident occurred, though most developing countries cannot or will not prosecute MNCs. 31 A poor second option is to file suit in Europe, where the courts usually lack both jurisdiction and the ability to enforce a judgment. 32 International authorities-including international governmental organizations and tribunals-are similarly limited. 33 While the American legal system appears to be the 30 ("There are several reasons why a plaintiff would want to bring suit in a U.S. forum. First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more generous than the laws of other countries. Second, U.S. procedural law-in particular, notice pleading, liberal discovery, and aggregate (class action) litigation-provides plaintiffs substantial leverage in pleading, proving, trying to a favorable verdict, and settling their cases. Third, U.S. damages law-especially punitive damages and substantial jury awards-present the potential for a windfall for plaintiffs or, at a minimum, significant leverage to force defendants to settle." (footnotes omitted)). 35 But as this Section demonstrates, rarely do these lawsuits succeed, leaving few avenues for foreign parties to remedy corporate torts and crimes.
For example, a number of American statutes ostensibly support a cause of action over foreign acts. 38 The problem is that American laws are presumed to have a territorial reach extending only as far as the United States' sovereign borders. 39 That is, unless Congress has used express language to arrange otherwise. 40 Consider the most well-known human rights statute, the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS" But since independent factories employed the plaintiffs as part of Walmart's global supply chain, the laborers appeared to lack a contractual relationship with Walmart. 74 The plaintiffs sought to overcome this burden by noting that Walmart had enacted and ignored several internal policies governing contractee workplace conditions. 75 Because only a factory worker could benefit from these standards, the plaintiffs argued that they entailed third-party beneficiaries under Walmart's global supply contracts, which would give rise to liability in the United States.
76
The court disagreed though, ruling that Walmart 69 See Dryhurst, supra note 33, at 654-55. 70 See, e.g., Ebrahim v. Shell Oil Co., 847 F. Supp. 65, 66-67 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (ruling that an American hurt in Syria cannot sue affiliated and subsidiary companies of the company responsible since "[a] wholly-owned subsidiary of a company is a distinct legal entity, responsible for its own wrongs" and noting that, even if the plaintiff were suing the correct party, the plaintiff would still be unable to assert jurisdiction over the companies in an American court, considering the injuries and events all took place in Syria). 71 
Id.; see Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights
(2013) ("However, for victims of human rights abuses, limited liability within the corporate group can present significant obstacles to obtaining tort-based remedies from the ultimate parent(s) of the corporate group. Courts have elected to 'pierce the corporate veil' and reach the assets of a corporate parent only in exceptional circumstances involving abuse of the corporate form where the separation between the corporation and its shareholders produces inequitable results.").
72 572 F.3d 677. 73 Id. at 680. 74 Id. at 680, 682 (noting that the workers were employed by companies contracted to supply Walmart with manufactured goods). 75 Id. at 680. 76 Id. at 681-82 ("Plaintiffs argue that Wal-Mart promised the suppliers that it would monitor the suppliers' compliance with the Standards, and that Plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of that promise to monitor.").
reserved only the right to monitor contractees, which is substantially different from creating a legal obligation. 77 Alternatively, since Walmart had not exacted an " 'immediate level of "day-to-day" ' control over [the] supplier's employees," the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their relationship amounted to an implied employment contract.
78
Human rights victims are also seldom successful under American tort laws.
79 This is because courts must either dismiss international tort claims or apply the laws of the nation where the incident occurred. In Bridgestone, the Liberian rubber workers alleged that Firestone committed acts of negligence and recklessness, but their complaint ultimately failed to "articulate[] a viable basis for applying California law or Indiana law to the management of the Plantation in Liberia."
80 Likewise, the Exxon Mobil court found, pursuant to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 81 that "subject only to rare exceptions, the local law of the state where the conduct and injury occurred will be applied."
82 Indeed, this choice of law analysis often serves as a de facto barrier to liability since most developing countries lack the types of tort laws that can establish MNC liability. 83 Other 77 Id. at 682 ("Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to support the conclusion that Wal-Mart and the suppliers intended for Plaintiffs to have a right of performance against Wal-Mart under the supply contracts."). 78 Id. at 683 ("Such supply contract terms do not constitute an 'immediate level of "day-to-day" ' control over a supplier's employees so as to create an employment relationship between a purchaser and a supplier's employees."). 79 See Alford, supra note 1, at 1089 (discussing how the Supreme Court recently, and severely, limited the ability of U.S. courts to hear international torts claims and noting that "[a]s such, international human rights litigation as currently practiced in the United States is dead"). 183, 195, 198 (2010) (remarking that many foreign nations lack the judicial system to regulate MNCs, times, American courts entirely dismiss tort claims arising out of foreign events; this is because the doctrine of international comity encourages judicial deference to whichever legal system bears the strongest connection to the complained of incident. 84 In Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 85 for example, a Californian oil company helped the Colombian military bomb a Colombian village in hopes of protecting an oil pipeline. 86 When the victims filed suit in California-due to the Colombian government's refusal to prosecute-the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that Colombia's judicial system had the greatest relationship to, and interest in, the massacre. 
130 (1982) (providing a broad discussion of how these doctrines limit a plaintiff's ability to file suit in U.S. courts based upon, or involving, events occurring internationally). 90 The modern view of sovereign immunity is the "restrictive" theory, which provides:
[A] foreign state would enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts for its "sovereign" actions but not for its "private" acts. Importantly, application of this theory had the effect of transferring disputes involving foreign states from the diplomatic arena to adjudicatory forums-in particular, to litigation in national courts. In the words of one commentator, "The embrace of the restrictive theory of the immunity of foreign states around the globe is representative of the ongoing legalization of international relations."
And thus, when taking into account the limitations borne to American statutes and the protections afforded by corporate law, western companies are virtually immune from liability arising out of foreign torts and crimes-even when the alleged acts entail torture or murder. These harsh results, however, are the product of important, sage policies.
B. The Policies Underlying the Barriers to Human Rights Litigation
While this regulatory vacuum is the subject of much consternation, it is seldom discussed how it is rooted in global necessity. 93 After years of European fighting, the international community determined that international conflict is primarily caused by countries meddling in each other's affairs. 94 To ameliorate this danger, each state is considered sovereign, vested with plenary authority to promulgate rules and regulations in its own territorial borders. are often the forum of choice for foreign plaintiffs, who seek to take advantage of our liberal pretrial discovery rules; generous jury awards; and plaintiff-friendly liability laws, which allow both compensatory and punitive damages. To alleviate concerns about hearing cases with only a tenuous connection to the chosen jurisdiction, American courts have primarily employed the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Forum non conveniens allows a court, even though it has both personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, to decline to exercise this jurisdiction in favor of a more appropriate forum." (footnotes omitted)). 93 This landscape is the result of public laws and forums, referring only to those rights and obligations derived from governmental bodies.
Private laws and venues offer an alternative, contract-based source of authority, which has yet to be associated with human rights enforcement, presumably due to arbitration's embattled reputation. 100 But now several international agreements seek to use private dispute resolution as a mean to redress human right violations-and they seem to be doing so with actual success. So, in light of popular beliefs and it is on their consent that international order rests. These principles formed the basis of the international political, economic, and legal system for the subsequent three centuries."). 96 105 Critics point out that arbitration rarely gives private citizens legal standing to assert human rights claims or even considers human rights relevant to a hearing. 106 It thus matters little whether arbitration can conceivably promote human rights if the historical record suggests otherwise. So, in light of arbitration's theoretical advantages yet practical limitations, why is it now likely to emerge as a tool for human rights? The following sheds light on this issue by examining the manner in which both the American and international forms of arbitration interplay with human rights.
A. The Flawed Nature of American Arbitration
Arbitration in the United States is much maligned. 112 Only very limited circumstances allow a U.S. court to review an award, much less upset an arbitral award:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008) ("Under the terms of § 9, a court 'must' confirm an arbitration award 'unless' it is vacated, modified, or corrected 'as prescribed' in § § 10 and 11. Section 10 lists grounds for vacating an award, while § 11 names those for modifying or correcting one."); see also he FAA provides that arbitration clauses may be voided 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,' " implicating defenses such as unconscionability).
117 465 U.S. 1 (1984) . 118 The Court found that the legislative record suggests Congress intended the FAA to control more than arbitration disputes in federal courts. Because Congress likely meant to include state courts into the FAA's scope, the FAA displaces state law. Id. at 13, 21 ("We should not refuse to exercise independent judgment concerning the conditions under which an arbitration agreement, generally enforceable under the Act, can be held invalid as contrary to public policy simply because the source of the substantive law to which the arbitration agreement attaches is a State rather than the Federal Government. I find no evidence that Congress intended such a double standard to apply, and I would not lightly impute such an intent to the 1925 Congress which enacted the Arbitration Act.").
119 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
the Supreme Court reviewed judicially created carve outs that exempted certain industries and subject matters from the FAA's scope.
120
Employment contracts, for example, traditionally received greater scrutiny due to the power imbalances underlying most employment relationships. 121 However, the Court ruled that unless Congress has used express language to immunize a specific industry or contract type, 122 courts lack authority to carve out subject matters from the FAA.
123
As a result, nearly all binding arbitration clauses today are strictly enforced.
This landscape began to draw ire soon after it became apparent that arbitration lacks safeguards on par with public venues.
124
These criticisms grew louder in the 1990s when companies sought to reduce litigation costs using particularly skewed forms of arbitration.
125
For example, most arbitral tribunals operate confidentially, free to stray from legal precedent and rules of law.
126 And because arbitration is derived from contract, resourceful litigants can design the process to omit rules of evidence, discovery, and other standards of procedural 120 129 Some scholars note that, since arbitration clauses provide corporations with the right to choose the arbitrator, private jurists overwhelmingly favor corporations in hopes of 127 Comsti, supra note 123, at 9 ("Arbitral procedures frequently do not conform to minimum standards of fairness as guaranteed in a court of law. In forced arbitration, discovery is nonexistent or limited, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence do not apply, and there is no right to appeal. . . . [In turn,] [f]orced arbitration stacks the decks . . . ."). Professor Comsti explains that arbitration varies from public forums because litigants-and businesses in particular-may exploit the lack of procedural and fairness safeguards and protect company reputations by litigating in a confidential, private venue. Id. at 9-10 (stating that, in the employment contract context, the lack of procedural and fairness safeguards in arbitration terms often leads to contracts substantially favoring the more powerful drafting party).
128 Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/ multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print (last visited Mar. 2, 2016); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) ("By permitting companies to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued."). The states must follow the FAA's lead in harboring a public policy favoring arbitration since the Supreme Court found that the FAA preempts state law. See Raymond, supra note 17, at 667 (noting that while arbitration can provide many advantages, it would be wise to limit the use of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts where they are commonly found Parties to employment and consumer contracts, however, almost always have unequal bargaining power. These employees and consumers are often presented with take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion that leave little room for negotiation . . . ."). Schulz found that the use of arbitration provisions in consumer adhesion contracts produces a "one-sided" dispute resolution process, favoring the company. Arbitrators who impose penalties on companies are rarely selected again while those favoring companies are used consistently. 131 Although the FAA ostensibly includes a savings clause allowing courts to strike down unconscionable provisions, several recent Supreme Court cases suggest that even deeply flawed arbitration clauses are unlikely to be voided. 132 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 133 the Court reviewed California's public policy against enforcing arbitration clauses that limit a party's right to join a class action lawsuit. 134 The State argued that restricting class actions would dissuade injured parties from litigating small claims, encouraging companies to exploit unsophisticated parties when the stakes are low. 135 Class action lawsuits resolve this problem by providing a means to combine claims into a single lawsuit.
136
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that courts must strictly enforce binding arbitration clauses, essentially reducing the frequency in which injured parties will seek redress from 130 Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 129, at 1174-75 (finding that arbitrators who hope to receive compensation to arbitrate disputes have significant incentives to favor the business clients, which often choose their preferred arbitrator and employ them); see also Weidemaier, supra note 113, at 1138 ("What is undeniable . . . is that arbitrators are private actors who are chiefly accountable to the parties who pay their fees."). 131 Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 129, at 1174-75 (providing examples of arbitrators who lost business after finding in favor of private individuals over companies and citing another California study that showed 89.5% of California arbitrations were presided over by the same twenty-eight arbitrators and that companies usually win 94% of the time, suggesting that arbitrators respond to incentives favoring business interests). 132 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 128 (describing how Concepcion "impedes access to justice").
133 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 134 Id. at 356-57 (Thomas, J., concurring). 135 Id. at 340 (majority opinion) ("[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party 'from responsibility for [ -where it was established that certain arbitration clauses make pursuing claims economically irrational-the Court held that Congress overwhelming created a national policy favoring arbitration which only additional federal legislation can overcome.
139 And now after Concepcion and Amex, it is hard to envision a clause so lopsided as to violate the FAA.
140
While international arbitration wields a stronger reputation, most commentators suggest that it, likewise, poorly contemplates human rights.
B. International Arbitration
Despite being procedurally superior to American arbitration, critics assert that international arbitration is unable to promote global human rights and may even render detrimental effects. 141 As background, international arbitration emerged as a global imperative after World War II when foreign direct investment and trade began to boom. 142 But despite the benefits of transnational commerce, the system almost collapsed under 137 144 Upon such a seizure, an investor could only bring suit in the host country's court system, which rarely ruled in favor of alien interests. 145 Thus, the historical landscape put investors at the practical and legal mercy of host countries.
146
This inspired a couple of international agreements which each sought to resolve international investment disputes better than courts of law.
147
For example, during the mid-twentieth century, the World Bank enacted a regime known as the International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes ("ICSID"), governing investment disputes between host countries and foreign companies. 148 The ICSID's authority is derived from investment pacts called bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), which grant foreign investors a level of protection in their host countries.
149 Upon a BIT violation, an investor and host nation must submit to binding arbitration, bypassing each party's national court system. 150 However, an additional problem arose since arbitral judgments do not, by themselves, compel payment. 151 Historically, the act of fulfilling an award required a victorious party to seek enforcement in some place where the 143 Likewise, the New York Convention-which governs the enforcement of international arbitral awards-requires signatory states to honor foreign awards with the same respect given to "domestic sister-state judgment [s] ."
157 This means that enforcing parties are entitled to payment in any country that has ratified the New York Convention.
158
Honoring states have little authority to review an award's merits even despite most errors of fact or law. 159 In fact, nearly all member states blindly adhere to 152 In the case that a losing party refuses to honor a judgment, the victorious party must seek enforcement using an authority located where the loser possessed property. Id. at 344; see also Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 142 (explaining the arbitral process created to alleviate the fears derived from hometown litigation). 153 158 See Goodman, supra note 104, at 468-69 (explaining in the ICSID context that for legal and political reasons, arbitration awards are almost always enforceable because claimants have neither the right to seek appellate review in a national court nor do they have the ability to, ex ante, remove the dispute to a court of law). 159 See Drahozal, supra note 154, at 104 ("In countries that are party to the New York Convention, the arbitral situs, and no other country, can vacate an arbitration award."); Franck, supra note 141, at 1555. the New York Convention, as the system's efficacy is almost universally beneficial while contravening the convention is tantamount to a treaty violation. 160 And because nearly every country has adopted the New York Convention, 161 including the United States, 162 arbitral awards are generally enforceable without disruption. 163 The result is a system structured by sophisticated parties to resolve disputes more fairly than local courts in contrast to domestic arbitration. 164 However international arbitration's ability to redress human rights violations appears limited despite its structural advantages. 165 Recall that arbitration must have consent to hear a dispute-and once a forum's jurisdiction is established, it may only rule on issues to which the parties have agreed. 166 A MNC is thus unlikely to ratify a human rights agreement authorizing and consenting to arbitration; otherwise, the threat of liability would be established where none currently exists. For example, 160 . 161 Strub, supra note 153, at 1031-32. 162 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) . 163 See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 294-95 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that courts have few avenues through which they may overrule an arbitral award) ("Under Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention, a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award if '[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.' "). 164 Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 142 ("Accordingly, the desire of each party to avoid having a dispute determined by a foreign judicial forum fueled the growth of international commercial arbitration."). 165 Therefore, on the one hand, the efficient manner by which international arbitration resolves investment and commercial conflicts suggests the process is applicable to human rights enforcement.
This seems especially possible considering arbitration's ability to overcome most of the political dangers associated with courts of law. On the other hand, it also seems that, not only has international arbitration failed to benefit human rights victims, but it also might actually encourage MNCs to commit global atrocities. 170 Overcoming this hurdle is what makes recent enactments of certain international agreements so innovative. IIAs themselves are generally silent with respect to human rights matters, and do not expressly reference human rights-related obligations of States, much less seek to introduce any new human rights duties or obligations for governments or investors."). 170 Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that there are "no known" instances where arbitration has been used to promote human rights); see also Peterson, supra note 169, at 12 ("[A]t least to date, there have been no awards which address [human rights] to a meaningful degree.").
III. THE REALITY AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Despite the perception that international arbitration is inconsistent with human rights litigation, 171 this landscape is radically changing. In the last decade, a handful of international agreements have sought to include both binding arbitration and human rights terms, suggesting that such an arrangement could be successful. This development went largely unnoticed because the first generation of agreements incorporated human rights symbolically with sparse practical or legal effect. But then, in 2014, a number of international agreements began employing binding arbitration clauses with-for the very first time-the legal capacity to sanction MNCs for transgressing human rights. These agreements' early success inspired segments of the international community, including the United Nations, the International Olympic Committee, and the International Labor Organization, to employ, or consider using, similar arbitration clauses. This, indeed, was never before thought possible.
A. The Recent History of Arbitration in International Contracts and Agreements
One of the first agreements to incorporate human rights and arbitration was ratified nearly a half century ago by a collection of African nations, forming the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 172 ("African Refugee Agreement"). But since the African Refugee Agreement binds only sovereign states, not MNCs or individuals, it lacks the authority to regulate corporate behavior. Similarly, in 1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents was enacted, suffering from the same limitations as the African Refugee Agreement, unable to 171 Peterson & Gray, supra note 19, at 33 (finding that no international arbitral tribunals have ever found in a way that enforces human rights concerns). 172 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. IX, Sept. 10, 1969, U.N.T.S. 14691. subject corporations to its binding arbitration provision. 173 These agreements foreshadowed the use of arbitration in today's more socially conscious international agreements.
In 2003, Singapore and a small European conglomerate, comprised of Ireland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, enacted the EFTA-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 174 ("EFTASingapore Agreement"). The EFTA-Singapore Agreement is an investment treaty creating certain obligations among its signatory countries as host nations and their national companies as investors. Since the agreement is an international investment treaty, its arbitration clause extends beyond the pact's signatory countries, binding the investor corporations pursuant to the ICSID. 175 The novelty of the agreement is found in the preamble, which affirms each party's commitment to human rights. But, in addition to most preambles being legally benign, the probability that a global atrocity will arise out of trade between, for example, Lichtenstein and Singapore is quite low. While the EFTASingapore Agreement creates a relationship between investment and human rights, the arbitral mechanism is unlikely to sanction conduct or amend corporate behavior. Instead the human rights clause is symbolic, publicly suggesting a means for future agreements to enforce global standards using private forums. In a similar fashion, the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement's preamble affirms a commitment to human rights, including in the greater agreement a binding arbitration provision, though the pact also governs only investment disputes, excluding human rights violations from the scope of the enforcement process.
176
While these international agreements importantly suggest that arbitration is consistent with human rights enforcement, an actual accord employing arbitration in a manner altering behavior and sanctioning corporate conduct would not be enacted until 2014. 173 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, art. 13, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. 174 Free Trade Agreement, EFTA-Sing., June 26, 2002, http://wits.world bank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/EFTA-Singapore.pdf. 175 Id. art. 48. 176 See Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Colom., pmbl., ch. 21, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colom bia-colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-colombie.aspx?lang=eng.
B. International Arbitration and Human Rights Since 2014
Importantly, several international organizations have ratified, or are considering, agreements using arbitration to promote corporate standards of human rights. As background, the promise of arbitration as a human rights tool is largely attributable to western universities, which have long sought for a means to regulate the apparel industry. 177 In the early 1990s, media reports publicized working conditions in international garment factories, otherwise known as "sweatshops."
178 It soon became apparent that an area in which universities wielded leverage over the clothing industry was in the business of school-licensed apparel. 179 Since apparel companies need universities more than the schools rely upon any one manufacturer, several institutions began contractually requiring their apparel partners to use only factories abiding by certain labor standards. 180 But despite subsequent lawsuits-including the University of Wisconsin's action alleging that Adidas manufactured school apparel with substandard Indonesian factories 181 -the abuses continued. The watershed moment occurred after a series of fires destroyed garment factories in Bangladesh, one of which alone killed over a thousand workers. 182 Compounding the tragedy was Bangladesh's lack of tort law, preventing victims from seeking a legal remedy; 183 due to sovereignty issues, national and international authorities were unable to establish jurisdiction, largely shielding western apparel companies from liability. 184 However, the ensuing publicity inspired the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety ("Bangladesh Accord"), which most apparel companies ratified in October 2013 out of fear of losing university business.
185
The Bangladesh Accord currently obligates western apparel companies to improve factory standards 186 as well as repair high-risk dangers at potentially sizeable costs.
187
The Bangladesh Accord's key innovation lies in its dispute resolution process.
188
Initial conflicts are settled by the Bangladesh Accord's "Steering Committee," appeals of which are submitted to binding arbitration. First, the workers may have difficulty bringing the foreign brand to court in the workers' home jurisdiction. Second, the workers' direct employer-the supplier-may be judgment-proof, meaning that satisfaction of a judgment against the employer in the workers' homestate courts would be difficult or impossible . . . ."). 185 See, e.g., Cornell University Severs Business Ties with JanSport, CORNELL CHRON. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2014/10/cornelluniversity-severs-business-ties-jansport. 186 BANGLADESH ACCORD, supra note 16, at 1-2 ("The agreement covers all suppliers producing products for the signatory companies. The signatories shall designate these suppliers as falling into the following categories, according to which they shall require these supplier to accept inspections and implement remediation measures in their factories according to the following breakdown: 1. Safety inspections, remediation and fire safety training at facilities representing, in the aggregate, not less than 30%, approximately, of each signatory company's annual production in Bangladesh by volume ("Tier 1 factories"). 2. Inspection and remediation at any remaining major or long-term suppliers to each company ("Tier 2 factories"). Together, Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories shall represent not less than 65%, approximately, of each signatory company's production in Bangladesh by volume. 3. Limited initial inspections to identify high risks at facilities . . . ."). 187 Id. 190 And since the Bangladesh Accord prevents companies from shielding themselves behind the international supply chain, as it expressly binds companies to the acts of "all suppliers producing products,"
191 the Bangladesh Accord offers the first effective method to hold corporations liable for torts and other acts in the developing world. 192 The efficacy of the Bangladesh Accord is inferable from how several apparel companies reluctantly signed it, 193 some of which, such as the Gap, advocated for an alternative, substantially similar resolution that conspicuously lacked an arbitration clause.
194
Considering the large-scale adherence to the Bangladesh Accord, this agreement appears to mark the first instance in which arbitration is altering corporate behavior for the sake of human rights. 195 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, supra note 188 (remarking that the Bangladesh Accord has experienced no problems with the willingness of apparel companies to comply with the agreement). Bangladesh Accord's value extends beyond Bengali laborers, serving as a powerful example for other industries rife with human rights abuses.
Indeed, the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") soon followed suit, partly due to criticisms directed at the IOC for human rights violations allegedly committed by host nations and MNCs contracted to operate past Olympic Games.
196
For instance, media coverage publicized anti-LGBT laws enacted by the Russian government in the months preceding the Sochi Olympics.
197
Accusations also targeted MNCs for possibly violating the rights of low-skilled labor.
198
In 2014, the IOC responded by declaring that all future Olympic host city contracts would include provisions obligating signatories to uphold human rights. body would be redeemable worldwide pursuant to the New York Convention. Thus, similarly to the Bangladesh Accord, the emergence of political fortitude, combined with the efficacy of international arbitration, produced a legally enforceable human rights instrument able to bind MNCs.
Perhaps the most significant development concerns the willingness of the United Nations to consider human rights proposals potentially modeled after the Bangladesh Accord. In December 2014, the U.N.'s Business and Human Rights Forum first heard details of a potential international agreement using international arbitration as a means to bind MNCs to global codes of conduct. 201 The proposal established that the U.N.'s Guiding Principles on human rights could serve as the governing standard by which MNCs must abide. 202 Notably, the panel also asserted that MNCs might favor such an agreement, considering the growing demands for improved corporate behavior. 203 The recent popularity of public benefit corporations, in addition to several more traditional companies, which have made social consciousness a corporate objective, 204 suggests as much. 205 Some observers assert that a number of MNCs endeavor to improve global conditions but harbor fears of becoming competitively disadvantaged relative to those transgressing human rights. 206 MNCs might also enjoy a means to heal reputational damages levied from misdirected blame. 207 Therefore, considering the influence of the U.N. in tandem with the emerging social consciousness of both corporations and international audiences, the possibility of such an arbitral U.N. regime is becoming increasingly likely.
This Article suggests that the value of the Bangladesh Accord, IOC contracts, and other prior agreements are monumental since they offer powerful examples of how arbitration can be used to bind corporations to human rights. In fact, these international agreements strongly suggest that this trend is taking force. In light of the rapid emergence of socially conscious businesses and consumer bases, 208 other industries harboring the necessary political will and leverage are likely to advocate for a similar pact. Indeed, this was the case in the apparel industry landscape, where contempt for sweatshops and the buying power of universities pushed apparel leaders to abide by standards of conduct enforced by the New York Convention. Now, it seems that the international community is likewise responding by proposing a variety of means to promote human rights with arbitration.
IV. THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION
There are numerous means by which such an arbitral mechanism could be inserted into future contracts and agreements. Considering the recent growth of arbitration in human rights litigation, as well as its unfulfilled potential, this relationship may become the preferred method to promote socially responsible corporate behavior. However, there are also a number of obstacles suggesting that the merging of arbitration and human rights could face tension. The following discussion forecasts the future of human rights litigations, investigating possible applications as well as obstacles to implementation.
A. Possible Future Applications
The most promising mediums to promote human rights include BITs and other similar investment treaties; 209 this is because, pursuant to ICSID, jurisdiction over investment disputes already belongs to international arbitration. 210 More importantly, since sovereign nations ratify BITs, their consent effectively binds investor corporations without requiring MNCs to also assent. 211 This means that new BITs could be drafted, or current ones modified, to include human rights and arbitral terms. Already, ICSID panels have relied upon, and considered, human rights decisions from venues such as the European Court of Human Rights, but have lacked authority to hear allegations that an investor company violated human rights due to a lack of operative BIT language. 212 The key then is that the more influential nations must agree to only BITs with human rights clauses as a matter of course to initiate an international trend. This seems especially possible in light of certain BITs, including the EFTA-Singapore and Canada-Colombia free trade agreements, which already have symbolically incorporated such provisions. 213 In fact, it appears that the necessary political will needed to interject human rights into commercial treaties is mounting. 214 For example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), which is the current framework promoting international trade, uses a particularly respected form of arbitration. 215 The organization has received proposals to incorporate human rights into its general charter and also within the scope of its dispute resolution. 216 When considering that Canada and other nations are already ratifying these types of investor treaties, 217 a possibility exists that international commercial treaties could advance human rights using ICSID or UNCITRAL.
There are also a number of areas that could, or are likely to, generate industry-specific agreements mimicking the Bangladesh Accord. Since the primary catalyst of an effective international regime is a combination of outrage and buying power, the mineral extraction industry seems particularly amenable. 226 Then, in Papau New Guinea's ensuing war, the mining companies allegedly perpetrated additional human rights abuses including the acts of "prevent[ing] medicine, clothing and other essential supplies from reaching the people." 227 The Red Cross estimated that over 2,000 children died due to the lack of medicine and other vaccines. 228 American courts declined to hold the companies in Talisman and Rio Tinto liable, ruling that sovereignty and jurisdictional issues necessitated their dismissal. 229 Indeed, this type of accountability is rarely imposed by courts of law. 230 In light of the extractive industry's atrocities, nongovernmental organizations and concerned industry leaders have already enacted a few international agreements, ostensibly setting standards by which MNCs must follow. For instance, forty-nine countries have ratified the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 231 ("EITI Standard"). This agreement encourages signatories to increase industry openness, which some commentators suggest shames nations into abiding by acceptable standards. 232 The agreement binds only nation states, not MNCs, and has been criticized for lacking enforcement mechanisms that can obligate parties to adhere to their commitments. 233 Indeed, the EITI Standard omits an arbitration clause, or any similar mechanism, with the capacity to sanction transgressions. Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") offers guidelines for responsible mineral extraction, 234 and the Kimberley Process counters the illegal diamond trade, but each fails to either punish violators or encourage compliance. 235 Thus, considering the concentration of extractable resources in the developing world, the propensity of these corporations to violate human rights has been troubling. 236 But, it now appears that the extraction industry has become an especially ripe place for a human rights accord using international arbitration to resolve disputes. The problem has been the "race to the bottom." 237 So long as there is a lack of meaningful ways to enforce labor and environmental standards, developing nations will continue to compete for international business by declining to enforce such regulations, 238 though without doubt, few countries relish diminishing their quality of life to generate business. 239 Considering that developed nations-whose consumer bases are the primary purchasers of extractive resources-are forming a groundswell of support in light of notable atrocities, the demand for such an extractive industry agreement appears present. 240 Another area concerns international water. Oftentimes, MNCs operating in the developing world privatize local supplies, harming regions already suffering from a dearth of available water. 241 In fact, MNCs often demand ownership of local waterways as a condition precedent to foreign direct investment, pitting the willingness of developing nations against each other to relinquish control over drinkable water. 242 The problem is that earmarking water for private industry reduces access and raises the cost of the remaining supplies, creating crises when local populations cannot access or afford what is left. 243 This industry also harms agriculture that depends upon the availability of water, 244 killing 2.2 million people each year, the majority of whom being children. 245 In fact, the International Labor Rights Forum circulated a list of the fourteen worst corporate human rights offenders; notably, two of the companies were identified for privatizing water in developing nations. ountless nations and municipalities face pressure to privatize. Nations facing financial crises are often the most vulnerable to these pressures: desperate to stop the drain on state coffers of a failing water infrastructure, states are persuaded to privatize by private bidders and international lending institutions promising long-term investment, lower costs and access for all." (footnote omitted)). 243 See Kornfeld, supra note 241, at 710 (noting that in South Africa, the privatization of water has led to increased prices for water and that the populations that cannot afford the now more expensive water often turn to drinking water from lakes and rivers, increasing the rate by which South Africans are contracting cholera and other communicable diseases). 244 249 Contributing to this problem is the absence of a legal regime-effective or otherwise-governing water rights. While a handful of international human rights treaties mention access to water, including the Convention on the Rights of Children and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, none contemplates acts by MNCs. 250 Since corporations are rarely subject to international law, MNCs cannot violate an individual's right to water in the unlikely chance that such a standard even exists. 251 Thus, considering that only states might have a duty, albeit an unenforceable one, to provide clean drinking water, private actors are largely free to privatize supplies in developing countries despite the consequences. 252 However, considering the buying power of western consumers and growing concerns raised by water privatization, the water industry seems to be an appropriate industry for regulation. Since water depletion is often caused by the bottled water industry-as exemplified by Coca-Cola and Suez-the primary purchasers are generally wealthy westerners. This has prompted the growth of socially conscious bottled water companies, indicating that political will and buying power is forming. 253 For example, Starbucks sells Ethos Water, whose corporate mission includes providing clean drinking water to developing countries. 254 likely to prefer the status quo. While dissenting parties are unlikely to obstruct bilateral and other smaller-scale agreements, they could frustrate greater international regimes.
The concept of human rights must also be better defined.
262
A frequent issue arising in alien tort statute cases concerns whether an act constitutes a human rights violation under international law.
263
Considering that most international agreements define human rights rather broadly and without much description, it can be difficult to determine which behaviors are proscribed. MNCs, in turn, are likely to contest contract terms creating liability without knowing whether an act transgresses the agreement. 264 Thus, for this proposed contract mechanism to become more popular, it is imperative that future accords incorporate a more nuanced definition of human rights.
In sum, the absence of prior accords merging arbitration and human rights is likely due to a perception that this development was impossible. However, upon the Bangladesh Accord becoming the first effective representative agreement, the possibility, or even likelihood, that other industries sharing critical similarities with the apparel industry-including political will and buying power-could produce comparable agreements.
While 267 all of which have been accused of violating human rights. That said, numerous obstacles could frustrate this development, including the malleable definition of human rights, the opposition of influential actors, and a lack of ability of political will from arbitral tribunals.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to accomplish both theoretical and practical goals. On a practical level, this Article endeavors to explain a highly counterintuitive legal development. MNCs are largely immune from tort lawsuits-including human rights abuses-committed in the developing world. This is because courts in developing countries are often unable or unwilling to hold MNCs accountable, and western courts cannot assert jurisdiction due to a number of sovereignty and jurisdictional issues. But despite this landscape, arbitration seems ready to become the preferred means to impose human rights standards on corporate actors. This development may revolutionize the manner in which MNCs conduct business abroad, considering that never before recently has there been a process to legally encourage or demand corporation respect human rights in the developing world.
Furthermore, the promise of arbitration in human rights litigation is no longer just theoretical. Without much notice, several recent international agreements incorporated both arbitration and human rights terms, though it was not until the Bangladesh Accord that an agreement actually used a structure increasingly dominated by fewer global [MNCs] that have the power to demand low producer prices, while keeping consumer prices high, in turn increasing their profit margins. A World Bank study found that since 1974, agricultural commodity prices have fallen while consumer prices have increased, suggesting unfair trade in world commodity markets." (footnote omitted)). 267 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). After American doctors working for Pfizer sought to test an experimental drug on one group of Nigerian children while giving a second group a control drug, appellants filed suit. Id. "Appellants contend that Pfizer knew that Trovan had never previously been tested on children . . . . Pfizer allegedly concluded the experiment and left without administering follow-up care. According to the appellants, the tests caused the deaths of eleven children, five of whom had taken Trovan and six of whom had taken the lowered dose of Ceftriaxone, and left many others blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-damaged. altering corporate behavior. Considering that MNCs are in general compliance with the agreement, it seems that this enforcement mechanism is a success.
268
Other organizations, groups, and industries are taking notice, foreshadowing a future in which private remedies become the most common means to promote human rights.
For instance, the United Nations recently discussed proposals about a corporate human rights regime using arbitration as a means to make it legally binding. Likewise, Olympic host nation contracts now include human rights clauses, enforced by binding international arbitration. And, pursuant to the Bangladesh Accord, other socially conscious industries and enterprises are likely to leverage companies into similar accords and agreements. Accordingly, victims of human rights abuses may finally be able to seek relief using the least likely of mechanisms.
This Article also contributes to the arbitration literature. General perceptions of private venues conceive it as a tool for corporations to take advantage of less sophisticated parties. Included herein is a more nuanced discussion of both domestic and international arbitration, explaining why the latter is amenable to human rights litigation. It seems that due to the efficacy of the New York Convention, international arbitration probably represents the sole avenue which can incentivize corporations to adopt socially responsible behaviors in the developing world; this is in stark contrast to arbitration's popular reputation.
The theoretical contribution involves understanding why the arbitral process is superior to courts of law. Indeed, the perception is that courts of law lack the ingenuity or political will to draft laws creating international human rights standards. The reality is that the courts must avoid adjudicating these types of disputes because they may threaten another nation's sovereignty and, thus, spark international conflict. In other words, political and practical concerns make courts of law particularly poor venues to try human rights claims, as well as other foreign corporate torts. But, since arbitral tribunals are private actors-able to act without threatening the same 268 Skype Interview with Rob Wayss, supra note 188.
